When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be subsidized and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources which have renounced any subsidies in question or from which undertakings under the terms of this Agreement have been accepted. Any exporter whose exports are subject to a definitive countervailing duty but who was not actually investigated for reasons other than a refusal to cooperate shall be entitled to an expedited review in order that the investigating authorities promptly establish an individual countervailing duty rate for that exporter.
SCM Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 19.3 (emphasis added). price of a product, which depends on whether and to what extent domestic subsidies have "passed through"
18 to the export price. 19 As such, the investigating authority must take the necessary steps to adjust its methodology to take account of this factual situation, including the degree of pass-through of the subsidy. 20 The AB's decision has had a powerful and ongoing effect, leading to the United States Congress's March 2012 passage of "An Act to Apply the Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 to Nonmarket Economy Countries, and for Other Purposes" and to extensive changes in Commerce's administrative practice for extant and newly filed trade cases. 21 Commerce practice is now again before the WTO's AB to determine its consistency with the decision that this Note addresses.
22
The AB's Completion of the Analysis poses several questions. Must an investigating authority adjust for the full doubled remedy in the countervailing and antidumping calculations by setting the countervailing duty equal to only the portion of the subsidy passed through to export price and adjusting the antidumping duty for any excess remedy still represented in a diminished countervailing duty? Is it possible to reconcile U.S. law, which requires the amount of the countervailing duty to be equal to the amount of subsidy that is found to exist, and the AB's decision? 23 In order to meet its WTO obligations, should the United States return to its 18 "Pass-through" is an economic term that describes the amount of the subsidy that affects the export price. A countervailing duty is a tariff levied on an imported good to offset subsidies provided to producers or exporters of that good in the exporting country. 30 A subsidy is a financial contribution offered by a government that confers a benefit. 31 In theory, a countervailing duty does not create a distortion in trade because the import duty is equal to or less than the amount of the conferred subsidy, offsetting-that is, countervailing-the subsidy's effect and restoring neutrality. 32 The economic reasoning is that a competitive industry will reflect, in its pricing, the full amount by which costs are lowered due to a subsidy. 33 The rationale for setting an offsetting duty arises from a concern that a lowered price in the importing country could harm an industry in that country. 34 While the original economic rationale for the countervailing duty applied to export subsidies alone, The Tariff Act of 1922 extended countervailing duties to subsidies on the manufacture or production of commodities. (2006) . Export subsidies encourage export sales over domestic sales; a typical example would be a favored tax treatment for revenues earned from exports. Subsidies on the manufacture or production of an article typically lower production costs; an example would be subsidized loans from a government to particular industries. The latter subsidies also include those on distribution, financing, and so forth, and are typically called "domestic" subsidies to distinguish them from subsidies aimed to encourage exports over domestic sales. Unlike export subsidies, domestic subsidies are not specific to any particular market.
When Commerce initiates a countervailing duty proceeding, the proceeding is against a country and a product. 36 In reversing its policy, Commerce argued that China had enacted significant and sustained economic reforms, which allowed China's economy to advance sufficiently beyond the "Soviet-style command economy," so that Commerce could meaningfully quantify subsidies.
48
As a result, Commerce could quantify the transfer of specific financial contributions and benefits from the government to producers in China. 49 More specifically, "Commerce determined that wages between employers and employees largely appeared to be subject to renegotiation; foreign investment, though directed, was largely permitted; many state-owned enterprises had been privatized; and China's command economy had receded and the majority of prices had been words, the foreign manufacturer charges a price for its product that is "less than its fair value." 55 An investigating authority imposes antidumping duties against a product or a country to offset "unfairly" low prices offered by a foreign producer or exporter.
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Like the application of countervailing duties, to impose an antidumping duty, U.S. law requires three elements: (1) the presence of dumped goods (dumping); (2) threat of a material injury (injury); 57 and (3) a causal link between the dumping and the injury (causation). 58 The double remedy issue is a result of the methodology that Commerce uses to establish the first element. Commerce determines whether the manufacturer's goods are sold in the United States for less than its normal value, calculating the dumping margin equal to any excess of normal value over the net U.S. price. 59 The objective of the normal value and export price calculations is to put both amounts on a net, ex-factory basis to allow for comparability.
60
Commerce calculates the "net U.S. price" starting from the price charged to a U.S.
customer and netting back for movement and other expenses to the factory gate in the exporting country. 61 Commerce determines normal value from one of three sources: (1) the net home market price in the exporting country; (2) third country prices charged by industries in the exporting country; or (3) constructed value.
62
Home Market Prices: The home market price is netted back to the "ex-factory level" for the product under investigation. 63 This is the preferred method for determining a dumping margin for each foreign firm. 64 The ex-factory level is the implicit price of the product at the moment it leaves the factory and is calculated separately for different firms involved in a proceeding. Constructed Value: Commerce has broad discretion to use a "constructed value" instead of sales as a basis for normal value. 67 The production costs of the exported product are grossed up for selling and general expenses, as well as an imputed profit, to reach a proxy for factorygate prices. 68 In cases involving market economies, the production costs are those of the firm under investigation.
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In the case of non-market economy countries, the above hierarchy is abandoned in favor of always using constructed value based on "surrogate" costs of production. 70 In order to apply the non-market economy country methodology, Commerce must determine that "the subject 70 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (2006) (stating when "(A) the subject merchandize is exported from a nonmarket economy country, and (B) the administering authority finds that available information does not permit the normal value of the subject merchandise to be determined … the administering authority shall determine the normal value of the subject merchandise on the basis of the value of the factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise and to which shall be added an amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, covering, and other expenses." 
A. The WTO Panel
Before the WTO Panel, China argued that the concurrent application of countervailing and antidumping duties was inconsistent with the United States' WTO obligations because, in some instances, the simultaneous application of antidumping and countervailing duties on the same products from China created a situation where the same instance of subsidization was offset twice.
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As previously discussed, when calculating a dumping margin in an antidumping investigation involving a product from a non-market economy, Commerce compares the export price to a constructed normal value, which is calculated based on surrogate costs or prices from a third country. 89 The normal value is based on the surrogate values because Commerce considers prices and costs in non-market economies to be unreliable. 90 This same antidumping procedure is followed whether or not the Chinese producer receives domestic subsidies, and whether or not there is an accompanying countervailing duty case. 91 However, when a producer receives a subsidy, its costs fall and, consequently, its domestic and export prices may fall as well. 92 In cases involving market economy countries, the United States and other WTO signatories effectively assume that these effects are equal, so that there is no net effect of the subsidy on the antidumping calculation, and thus no double remedy issue created by applying a countervailing 86 Panel Report, supra note __, at ¶ 1. duty to a domestic subsidy. 93 But the use of surrogate costs from a different country means that those costs will not reflect-will not be lowered by-the amount of subsidy received by the Chinese firm. 94 However, the export price, which reflects the sales by the Chinese company to the United States with no use of surrogates, is presumably lower than it would have otherwise been due to the subsidy; this, after all, is the rationale for a countervailing duty being imposed. 95 Therefore, the resulting dumping margin is based on an asymmetric comparison and is generally higher than it would be in a market economy antidumping duty calculation. 96 An antidumping duty that is calculated on a non-market methodology may therefore "remedy" a domestic subsidy to the extent that such subsidy has contributed to a lower export price. 97 In other words, China asserted that this non-market economy country antidumping calculation takes into account the presence of domestic subsidies, and thus when Commerce also imposes a countervailing duty, Commerce is repeating the same exercise.
98 Accordingly, the simultaneous or concurrent imposition of an antidumping duty based on the non-market economy methodology and a countervailing duty based on a domestic subsidy results in a subsidy being offset more than once; the United States overcorrects for the foreign government subsidization and/or foreign firms' market power.
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A comparison of Table 1 and Table 2 , below, illustrates how a double remedy occurs. twice in the countervailing and antidumping duty calculations does not occur because both sides of the antidumping calculation reflects the subsidies' effects, leaving no net effect.
In circumstances, in which a foreign producer in a market economy receives a domestic subsidy of US$2; the producer has a normal value of US$8; the producer sells in the investigating authorities' domestic market at US$7; the producer's export price is US$1 lower than its domestic value (US$8), based on its domestic sales or production costs, an investigating authority would impose a countervailing duty of US$2 because the countervailing duty, in practice, is equal to subsidy and an antidumping duty of US$1, totaling US$3. These trade remedies properly maintain a "level playing field" with regards to the disparity in the market prices. 100 The imposition of the duties effectively treats the subsidy as reflected in both normal value and export price and thus having no effect on the dumping margin. This reflects standard U.S. practice in combined countervailing and antidumping duty cases that involve market economies. On the other hand, Table 2 considers circumstances in which simultaneous antidumping and countervailing duties are assessed in a non-market economy country, illustrating the double remedy result. Table 2 assumes the following: a foreign producer in a non-market economy receives a subsidy of US$2; the producer has a normal value of US$8; the producer sells in the investigating authorities' domestic market at US$7; the producer's export price is $1 lower than its domestic prices (US$8). In this case, the investigating authorities would continue to set the countervailing duty at US$2 because the countervailing duty is set equal to the subsidy. 102 The investigating authorities, however, would not use the foreign producer's normal value because the investigating authorities consider prices and costs in non-market economies to be unreliable. 103 The normal value in a non-market economy is therefore based on surrogate costs from a third country. 104 If the normal value in the surrogate market is US$10, the higher amount reflecting the fact that the surrogate market companies do not enjoy the US$2 subsidy, and the foreign producer's export price is US$7, the investigating authorities would set the antidumping duty at US$3 after comparing the export price to the surrogate market normal value (calculated by subtracting the export price (US$7) from the surrogate market value ($10)). This antidumping duty, unlike the antidumping duty applied to a market economy, does not create a level playing field because the export price reflects the subsidy while that effect is removed from normal value due to the use of a surrogate value. 
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B. United States Federal Court Proceedings
At the same time as the dispute before the WTO Panel, several Chinese companies 109 whose products were the subject of the countervailing and antidumping duty investigations filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). 110 In September 2009, the CIT acknowledged the existence of a double remedy issue and remanded the matter to Commerce to assess concurrent countervailing and antidumping duties in a manner that avoided a double remedy. 111 Subsequently, the CIT in 2010 found that Commerce failed to comply with its instructions and ordered Commerce to forego the imposition of countervailing duties on pneumatic off-the-road tires from China. 112 The United States appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), 113 and on December 19, 2011, the CAFC broadly held that U.S. law forbade the application of countervailing duties to non-market economy countries. The appropriateness of the countervailing duties cannot be determined without having regard to anti-dumping duties imposed on the same product to offset the same subsidization. The amount of a countervailing duty cannot be "appropriate" in situations where that duty represents the full amount of the subsidy and where antidumping duties, calculated at least to some extent on the basis of the same subsidization, are imposed to remove the same injury to the domestic industry. Dumping margins calculated based on [a non-market economy] methodology are, for the reasons explained above, likely to include some component that is attributable to subsidization. Importantly, the AB also went a step further, concluding that an investigating authority has an affirmative obligation to establish whether or to what degree the concurrent application of countervailing and anti-dumping duties would offset the same subsidization twice. 
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The AB distinguished between the legal and factual matter of double remedies, concluding that double remedies do not necessarily result in every instance of such concurrent application of duties when an investigating duty is using the non-market economy methodology. 125 The offsetting of the same subsidization twice depends, rather, on whether and to what extent domestic subsidies have lowered the export price of a product, and on whether the investigating authority has taken the necessary steps to adjust its methodology to take account of 122 law forbade the application of countervailing duties to nonmarket economy countries. 142 Further, the new legislation also attempted to comply with the AB's holding that the concurrent application of countervailing and antidumping duties to a nonmarket economy country has the potential to create a "double remedy," which is prohibited by the SCM Agreement. 143 The new law requires that Commerce grant an offset to the antidumping calculation if (1) a respondent received a countervailable subsidy other than an export subsidy; (2) the countervailable subsidy reduced the prices of the subject imports; and (3) Commerce can reasonably estimate the extent to which the countervailable subsidy has increased the dumping margin for the subject imports. 144 Commerce may not reduce combined duties to less than the stand-alone antidumping margins.
Most notably, however, the new legislation does not require Commerce to grant a reduction to the countervailing duty value, implicitly complying with the current U.S. law that requires Commerce to impose a countervailing duty "equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy." 146 Congress's acknowledgment that a domestic subsidy lowered the export price in the antidumping calculation but not for purposes of the countervailing duty calculation is mathematically illogical. This error might be the result of the fact that Congress designed the nonmarket antidumping statute to remedy Commerce's previous inability to apply countervailing duty law to nonmarket economy countries, 147 and as such, Congress believed that it could independently offset the double remedy under the antidumping calculation. As this Note will address below, Congress could offset a double remedy in the antidumping calculation by requiring an adjustment in normal value downwards by the amount of the subsidy to correct for the double remedy problem otherwise created by the countervailing duty and the discarding of the (subsidized) normal value of the exporter. 148 In this case, no measurement of the degree of the subsidy pass-through to the export price would be necessary. Therefore, Congress has left the double remedy dispute unresolved by applying only part of the AB's solution to the U.S.
countervailing and antidumping methodologies. 3.80 $ * U.S. CVD = subsidy amount, regardless of pass-through * Equivalently, the surrogate NV could be decreased by the $1.20 in pass-through.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE DOUBLE REMEDY DISPUTE
A careful analysis of the AB's decision reveals several solutions to the double remedy dispute. First, the United States could revert to its longstanding policy of not applying countervailing duties to non-market economy countries. After all, the non-market economy country antidumping duty methodology was arguably designed to compensate for the lack of countervailing duty. 151 created by the countervailing duty and the discarding of the (subsidized) normal value of the exporter. Third, if China challenges the U.S. law that requires the countervailing duty to be set equal to the amount of the subsidy, an investigating authority could adjust both the countervailing and anti-dumping duty; in the preceding example, this requires that the countervailing duty be set equal to US$1.20.
The second approach, illustrated as Table 4 , adjusts the surrogate normal values downwards by the amount of the subsidy to correct for the double remedy problem otherwise created by the countervailing duty and the discarding of the (subsidized) normal value of the exporter. Because the non-market economy country antidumping statute was designed to remedy
Commerce's inability to apply countervailing law to non-market economy countries, this approach would account for Commerce's decision to reverse its policy against the imposition of countervailing duties against non-market economy countries, thereby eliminating the double remedy. The final approach, illustrated as Table 5 , perhaps most closely resembling the AB's view, taking account of the amount of pass-through. The investigating authorities determine that 60% of the US$2 subsidy "passes through" to the export price. An "on-the-face" reading of the Among these three solutions, the second approach is the most practicable solution. The first approach is not practicable because the recent legislation and countervailing and antidumping duty practices illustrate Congress's and Commerce's reluctance to revert to the long-standing policy that prohibited the application of countervailing duties to non-market economy countries. Although the third approach offers a solution that closely follows the language of the AB's decision, it would require a change in U.S. trade law. The second approach, however, reaches the same result of the third approach, eliminating the potential for a double remedy without the modification of existing U.S. law.
152
V. CONCLUSION
The AB's holding, in its Completion of the Analysis section, ignores a factual impossibility. The AB requires an adjustment so that both the countervailing and antidumping duty amounts are "appropriate" under Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement, but a countervailing duty adjustment is legally impossible under U.S. law. In attempt to comply with the AB's decision, the United States Congress enacted legislation which authorized Commerce to continue apply countervailing duties to imports from non-market economy countries, overriding the CAFC's holding that U.S. law forbade the application of countervailing duties to non-market economies, and incorporating the AB's holding into the legislation's language. As demonstrated above, however, the double remedy issue remains unresolved. Large numbers of cases continue to be filed with Commerce in which the double remedy issue plays a critical role. 156 In order to eliminate double remedies, the United States could (1) revert to its longstanding policy prohibiting the application of countervailing duties against non-market economies, (2) adjust the surrogate normal value downwards by the amount of the subsidy, or (3) adjust both the countervailing and antidumping duty by the amount of the pass-through. Until the double remedy dispute is resolved, "trade disputes among nations might continue to produce intractable situations where economies and politics conspire to impair long-term solutions."
